About the models Held has said that the models are complex networks about economic and social conditions of the democratic state. While presenting the model Held has not allowed his prejudices to dominate. He has impartially portrayed the picture of democratic structure. The following are the six models of democracy:
According to Nozick there are three sets of rules of justice, defining: A distribution is just if it has arisen in accordance with these three sets of rules. Nozick does not try to specify in detail the rules under the above three headings 'I shall not attempt that task here', p.
However, he does give some further information on rules of acquisition; see p. He follows John Locke who as Nozick interprets him held that a person has a right 1 to own what he makes, and 2 to appropriate anything not already owned, provided he leaves 'enough and as good' for others - i.
Nozick calls this the 'Lockean proviso'. It is not clear how Nozick would defend 1 against his own criticisms of Locke A comparison of freedom rousseau marx and mills.
As for 2he points out that the proviso cannot reasonably be taken to mean that there can be no worsening of others' opportunities to appropriate; it must mean that in other respects they are no worse off. Nozick raises the question 'No worse than they would be how? In Rawls's theory the representative worst-off person must be no worse off than he would be under any other possible arrangement.
Nozick rejects this, but does not define another baseline: However, 'whether or not Locke's particular theory of appropriation can be spelled out so as to handle various difficulties, I assume that any adequate theory of Justice in acquisition will contain a proviso similar to the weaker of the ones we have attributed to Locke'; p.
Nozick says that the proviso is violated if a person appropriates all of something necessary to life - or purchases it, or combines with the other owners of it, or finds himself the sole owner when other supplies are lost e.
Nozick refers to the possibility of losing entitlement to something that was originally yours because of developments since, such as the drying up of other waterholes, as the 'historical shadow' of the Lockean proviso; p.
Comparison with Rawls's Theory Nozick classifies theories of justice as 1 either end-result or historical, and 2 either patterned or unpatterned. The entitlement theory is historical and unpatterned.
It does not demand that the distribution resulting from just acquisitions, transfers and rectifications be patterned, i.
Any distribution, irrespective of any pattern it may or may not have, is just provided it has the appropriate history, provided it did in fact come about in accordance with the rules of acquisition, transfer and rectification.
Rawls's theory on the other hand, is an end-result theory. Choice of principles behind a 'veil of ignorance', must be based on calculations about what people are likely to end up with under the various possible sets of principles - there is no other way of choosing is there?
Therefore if any historical entitlement theory is correct, Rawls's approach is wrong. Notice that this imposes on Rawls in the job of showing that no possible version of an historical entitlement theory could be correct.
He might reply that he intends to stick to his own theory until someone actually produces a correct entitlement theory; Nozick has not, because his theory is merely a sketch with many important details not worked out.
Nozick points out p. Rawls specifies an initial situation and a process of deliberation, and say that whatever rules results from this are the rules of justice; similarly Nozick specifies a process, and says that whatever distribution results is just.
But Rawls's process for generating principles cannot generate process principles, but only end-result principles. Nozick says that this is ironic.
It presents a dilemma: This is a weak argument. Rawls can claim that his process is 'great' without having to hold that all processes, just because they are processes, are great.
There are many pages of criticism of details of Rawls's argument which we cannot follow here or even there, sometimes! Patterns and Liberty Others besides Rawls have put forward 'pattern' theories. Nozick advances an objection against all of them: If justice consists in the pattern in which goods are distributed, then giving - which changes the pattern - will be unjust.
Thus pattern theories do not merely correct the mal-distribution which allegedly happens under an entitlement theory; they also alter the concept of possession. Note Nozick's concept of ownership: No Central Distributor 'Pattern' theories sometimes picture some person or institution faced with the problem of fairly distributing the sum total of good things: But, Nozick maintains, things are never collected into a sum total to be allocated by a central distributing authority.
Hearing the term distribution most people presume that some thing or mechanism uses some principle or criterion to give out a supply of things There is no central distributor, no person or group entitled to control all the resources, jointly deciding how they are to be doled out.
But since things come into existence already held or with agreements already made about how they are to be heldthere is no need to search for some pattern for unheld holdings to fit; and since the process whereby holdings actually come into being or are shaped, itself needn't realize any particular pattern, there is no reason to expect any pattern to result In the non-manna-from-heaven world in which things have to be made or produced or transformed by people, there is no separate process of distribution for a theory of distributions to be a theory of'; p.
No Presumption of Equality Nozick ask why it is to be assumed that differences between persons are arbitrary unless they can be justified.
A central distributor would perhaps be bound to treat all alike unless for good reason, but in a free society distribution results from many localized exchanges between individuals entitled to bestow their holdings as they wish.
The Natural Lottery not Unjust According to Rawls, the veil of ignorance should conceal the distribution of natural talents, because rules reflecting this distribution would not be just.May 20, · Although his concept of freedom is a bit strange in my opinion, it is still better than Rousseau’s paradoxical concept of freedom embodied through the “general will” where he clearly links public interest to equality and private interest to preferences.
Although freedom is the ultimate goal of both Mill and Marx, their concepts are different and the implementation in a free society is very much in conflict. "Mankind are greater gainers by suffering each other to live as seems good to themselves, than by compelling each to live as seems good to the rest/5(7).
Marx quoted Rousseau favorably that “Whoever dares undertake to establish a people’s institutions must feel himself capable of changing, as it were, human nature to take from man his own powers, and give him in exchange alien powers which he cannot employ without the help of other men.”.
As Gerth and Mills (, p. 50) put it, 'Marx's emphasis upon the wage worker as being "separated" from the means of production becomes in Weber's perspective, merely one special case of a . A Brief History of Political Thought and Statecraft: From Socrates to Rousseau, Hegel and Marx, Tomorrow's World of Free Nations Henry Paolucci / Paperback / British Hegelians The following summaries survey a variety of social and political topics, ranging from theoretical analyses of community, bureaucracy, and Kantian political reason to historical studies of the social-political thought of Rousseau, the Utilitarians, Samuel Gompers, Bergson, and Oakeshott.